The Borderlands between Science and Philosophy. An Introduction, Książki, Nauka, Philosophy of Science (but not ...
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VOLUME 83, NO. 1
THE QUARTERLY REVIEW OF BIOLOGY
MARCH 2008
THE BORDERLANDS BETWEEN SCIENCE AND PHILOSOPHY:
AN INTRODUCTION
MASSIMO PIGLIUCCI
Departments of Ecology & Evolution and Philosophy, Stony Brook University
Stony Brook, New York 11794 USA
E-MAIL: PIGLIUCCI@GENOTYPEBYENVIRONMENT.ORG
KEYWORDS
science, philosophy, intelligent design, paranormal phenomena,
pseudoscience
ABSTRACT
Science and philosophy have a very long history, dating back at least to the 16th and 17th
centuries, when the first scientist-philosophers, such as Bacon, Galilei, and Newton, were beginning
the process of turning natural philosophy into science. Contemporary relationships between the two
fields are still to some extent marked by the distrust that maintains the divide between the so-called “two
cultures.” An increasing number of philosophers, however, are making conceptual contributions to
sciences ranging from quantum mechanics to evolutionary biology, and a few scientists are conducting
research relevant to classically philosophical fields of inquiry, such as consciousness and moral
decision-making. This article will introduce readers to the borderlands between science and philosophy,
beginning with a brief description of what philosophy of science is about, and including a discussion
of how the two disciplines can fruitfully interact not only at the level of scholarship, but also when it
comes to controversies surrounding public understanding of science.
ENCE AND PHILOSOPHY has always
been tormented, ever since science itself
slowly evolved from “natural philosophy”
during the 16th and 17th centuries, thanks
to the work of people who thought of
themselves as philosophers, and most of
whom we consider scientists: Francis Ba-
con, Galileo Galilei, and Isaac Newton, to
mention a few. As in any parent-offspring
relationship, things can get acrimonious,
with the offspring staking out its territory
while denying the parent’s relevance or
contribution, and the latter having a diffi-
cult time letting go of the now adult and
independent progeny.
In this paper, I wish to provide some
considerations for a constructive discus-
sion of the science-philosophy border-
lands, which I unofficially call “sci-phi,” in
the hope that both scientists and philoso-
phers will be prompted to give more
thought to the matter and see where there
are meaningful bridges to build, and
where the two disciplines can operate
largely independently of each other. This
The Quarterly Review of Biology,
March 2008, Vol. 83, No. 1
Copyright © 2008 by The University of Chicago. All rights reserved.
0033-5770/2008/8301-0002$15.00
7
T
HE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN SCI-
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THE QUARTERLY REVIEW OF BIOLOGY
VOLUME 83
is neither an apology on behalf of philos-
ophers nor an invitation to scientists to
become philosophers. The first is not
needed because philosophy is an autono-
mous area of scholarship, which certainly
does not need any more justification than,
say, literary criticism or quantum electro-
dynamics. The second would be missing
the point since, although I think that sci-
entists may benefit from a better acquain-
tance with philosophy, the latter is not
something that a scientist could easily do
on his own if only he had a couple of spare
weekends a month.
Therefore, I will begin by outlining what
philosophy of science actually consists of,
discussing where it can directly contribute
to science and where it is best thought of as
an independent field of study. I will then
provide examples of how philosophers can
be useful to scientists, not just within the
narrow confines of scientific research, but
in the broader quest for a better under-
standing of science on the part of the gen-
eral public. I will then conclude by advo-
cating “sci-phi” as a good model for much
needed interdisciplinarity in the pursuit of
new models of scholarship and teaching.
ables, including electrons and forces, and
positivists were indeed highly skeptical of
the whole affair, which smelled too much
of metaphysics (a bad word, in their vocab-
ulary). It is also true that some scientists,
first and foremost Einstein, were rather un-
comfortable with the wildest implications
of quantum mechanics (as in Einstein’s
famous quip that “God doesn’t play dice”)
and resisted them while searching for al-
ternative interpretations of the theory.
Nonetheless, I seriously doubt that one can
lay an alleged “slowing down” of turn-of-
the-century physics at the doorsteps of phi-
losophy. First, philosophy has simply never
had, in recent memory, much of a sway
with scientists. This is in part because sci-
entists tend to be interested in whichever
approaches maximize discovery, not in
philosophical issues about metaphysical
truths (Franklin 2005). Second, although
it is of course impossible to rewind the tape
and experiment with historical sequences,
quantum mechanics was actually accepted
very quickly by the scientific community,
especially when one considers its radical
departure from any previous physical
theory—for example, the introduction of
the concept of true, as opposed to instru-
mental, indeterminability (the Heisenberg
principle).
A diametrically opposite view to Wein-
berg’s is the one expressed by Daniel Den-
nett (perhaps not surprisingly, a philoso-
pher), in his
Darwin’s Dangerous Idea
:
“There is no such thing as philosophy-free
science; there is only science whose philo-
sophical baggage is taken on board without
examination” (1995:21). This will strike
most scientists as preposterously arrogant,
but a moment’s reflection shows that Den-
nett, of course, is right. For example, sci-
entific practice requires the assumption of
naturalism, i.e., the idea that natural phe-
nomena are indeed natural, and, there-
fore, scientists do not need to invoke the
supernatural to explain them. I shall say
more about this specific point below, but it
is interesting to note that scientists them-
selves invoke naturalism as a postulate of
science whenever they need to make the
(convincing) argument that Intelligent De-
WHAT PHILOSOPHY (OF SCIENCE) IS AND
IS NOT ABOUT
Nobel physicist Steven Weinberg (1992)
took the rather unusual step of writing a
whole essay entitled “Against Philosophy.”
In it, he argued that not only is philosophy
not useful to science, but that, in some
instances, it can be positively harmful. The
example he provided was the alleged slow
acceptance of quantum mechanics, due to
the philosophical school of positivism en-
dorsed by so many scientists in the early
20th century, beginning with Einstein.
Positivism is a now abandoned philo-
sophical position— originally associated
with the so-called Vienna Circle—that
takes a rather narrowly na¨ve view of what
counts as science. Most famously, positivists
thought that science had no business deal-
ing with “unobservables,” i.e., with postu-
lating the existence of entities that cannot
be subjected to experimental tests. Quan-
tum mechanics is rife with such unobserv-
MARCH 2008
“SCI-PHI” SYMPOSIUM
9
sign “theory” is not science (Pigliucci
2002). The important thing to realize is
that naturalism is not an empirically verifi-
able position, and, therefore, it is by defi-
nition outside of science itself (if science is
about anything at all, it is about empirically
verifiable statements about the world).
Attitudes such as Weinberg’s are largely
the result of ignorance of what philosophy
of science is about, and I am convinced
that such ignorance hurts science. It cer-
tainly does not help to bridge what C P
Snow (1959) famously referred to as the
divide between “the two cultures.” Let me
then briefly sketch what I think are the
proper domains of philosophy of science,
and where they do, or do not, intersect
with the practice of science. Generally
speaking, philosophy of science deals with
three broad areas of inquiry, which I refer
to as nature of science, conceptual and
methodological analysis of science, and sci-
ence criticism (Chalmers 1999).
Most scientists, if they are familiar with
philosophy at all, have some acquaintance
with philosophical studies of the nature of
science. Names such as Karl Popper and
Thomas Kuhn even make it into the occa-
sional biology textbook, and one can argue
that falsificationism and paradigm shifts—
the most important respective contri-
butions of these two philosophers—are
among the few concepts in modern philos-
ophy of science that are ever mentioned in
the halls of science departments. Popper
and falsificationism are representative of a
prescriptive
streak in philosophy of science;
that is, they exemplify a tradition of philos-
ophers seeking to tell scientists how they
ought to carry out their work. Popper was
motivated by the so-called demarcation
problem, the difficulty in distinguishing
science from pseudoscience (he included
in the latter Freudian psychoanalysis and
Marxist theories of history). He was also
bothered by Hume’s problem of induc-
tion, the idea that science is based on in-
ductive reasoning, and yet the only reason
we have to trust induction is because it
worked in the past (which is itself a form of
induction, making the whole thing peril-
ously close to circular). Popper thought he
solved both problems with the idea of
falsification: science is really based on de-
ductive logic, not induction. This solves
Hume’s conundrum, but, since deduction
cannot truly establish proof of natural phe-
nomena (although it works fine for math-
ematical proofs), it turns out that science
can never prove anything but can only dis-
prove (i.e., falsify) theories.
It is rather ironic that many science text-
books have essentially adopted Popper’s
view of science as an enterprise dealing in
falsificationism, with many scientists actu-
ally
defining
science in Popperian terms.
Popperian falsificationism has long been
superseded in philosophy of science, partly
through the work of one of Popper’s own
students, Imre Lakatos (1977), who argued
that falsificationism does not work because
it is often possible to “rescue” a given the-
ory from demise by modifying some of the
ancillary assumptions that went into build-
ing it. This is a good thing too, and indeed
a reflection of how science really works.
Just think of the fact that the original Co-
pernican theory did not actually fit the
data very well, and yet it was not rejected as
“falsified.” Rather, scientists gave it some
time to develop because it seemed a prom-
ising approach. Subsequently, Kepler mod-
ified an important, though not central, as-
sumption of the theory, thus producing
results that correlated very well with the
data: the sun is indeed (almost) at the cen-
ter of the solar system, but the planets ro-
tate along elliptical, not circular, orbits, of
which the sun occupies not exactly the cen-
ter, but one of the foci.
Kuhn’s (1970) ideas as developed in
The
Structure of Scientific Revolutions
, are an ex-
ample of the
descriptivist
approach to the
study of the nature of science. Kuhn did
not pretend to tell scientists how to do
their work but was interested in figuring
out how science, as a process of discovery,
actually proceeds. His idea of paradigm
shifts was based on historical studies of as-
tronomy and physics (arguably, biology has
never undergone a paradigm shift after
Darwin), and represents a type of “punctu-
ated equilibria” theory of science, where
long periods of quasi-stasis are punctuated
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THE QUARTERLY REVIEW OF BIOLOGY
VOLUME 83
by sudden bursts of change. Kuhn thinks of
most scientific activity as “puzzle solving”
within an established conceptual frame-
work, the “paradigm.” Only rarely does the
accepted paradigm begin to show increas-
ing signs of inadequacy, which eventually
generates a crisis, which, in turn, is re-
solved when the community shifts to a new
paradigm. The change from the Ptolemaic
to the Copernican views of the solar system
is the classic example of a paradigm shift.
Another irony lies in the fact that many
scientists bought into the Kuhnian view,
although it also has been shown to be
highly problematic. In particular, his talk
of “incommensurability” (the inability to
translate concepts from one paradigm to
another) comes perilously close to denying
that science makes progress—as opposed
to simply shifting from one arbitrary view
of the universe to another. Indeed, despite
Kuhn’s own later protestations, the origi-
nal metaphor for a paradigm shift was what
in psychology is known as a Gestaltian
switch. We have all seen those pictures that
can be interpreted
equally well
as, say, being
an old witch or a beautiful young woman.
The point is that our brain suddenly
switches perspective from one interpreta-
tion to the other, but also that the switch is,
in fact, arbitrary, because the lines on the
paper do not actually favor
either
represen-
tation (indeed, they are meant to be am-
biguous).
Although scientists are aware of both the
prescriptive and descriptive streaks in the
philosophical study of the nature of sci-
ence, they seem to have accepted some
abandoned or at least highly problematic
views from philosophy, without much evi-
dence that more recent formulations (such
as Hull’s idea of “conceptual selection”
[1990] or Kitcher’s [1995] work on the
advancement of science) have even made
it to the scientist’s radar screen.
The second major area of inquiry in phi-
losophy of science is what I term concep-
tual and methodological analysis, and it
deals largely with tracing the historical use
and clarifying the meaning of fundamental
ideas and practices in the sciences. Hume
(1748) was among the first ones to take this
approach, inquiring about what we mean
when we talk about causality. (His analysis,
still surprisingly challenging today, was not
very encouraging.) More recently, critical
work on the conceptual foundations of
evolutionary theory and the practices of
quantitative genetics (Pigliucci and Kaplan
2006) falls into this group.
The third major type of philosophy of
science is what I term science criticism, and
it directly addresses the interface between
science and society. For example, philo-
sophical issues surrounding the nature-
nurture debate are relevant to the uses
and, more importantly, the misuses, of ge-
netic medicine (Kaplan 2000). Here the
philosopher becomes a critic not just of
how the science is being conducted and its
findings interpreted, but, primarily, of how
such findings are understood by the public
and used to guide social policies (Kitcher
2001).
What is a scientist to do with all this?
Scientists may largely and safely ignore
what philosophers say about how science
does or should work in broad terms—after
all, scientists want to
do
science, not to
think about how it is done (except occa-
sionally, when they are close to retire-
ment). They do, however, have a responsi-
bility to update their understanding of
philosophy when it comes to writing sci-
ence textbooks or teaching the nature of
science in the classrooms. Also, philoso-
phers clearly have the intellectual right to
pursue such inquiry into the nature of sci-
ence without having to justify themselves to
scientists by defending the “utility” (implic-
itly, to science) of what they do.
When we move to the second and third
areas of philosophical inquiry, we come
closer to the sci-phi borderlands, to the
point where, in some cases, philosophy
may be thought of as “the continuation of
science by other means” (Chang 2004). In-
deed, in areas from evolutionary biology to
quantum mechanics, it is sometimes diffi-
cult to tell whether a theoretical paper is
written by a scientist or by a philosopher
without directly checking the author’s in-
stitutional affiliation. Here the word “the-
ory” takes on its original and broader
MARCH 2008
“SCI-PHI” SYMPOSIUM
11
meaning of formulation of concepts, not just
mathematical treatment (although there are
examples of philosophers engaging in the
latter as well). What makes this blurred line
between philosophy and science interesting
is that the two disciplines bring different
backgrounds and approaches to the study of
the same issues—i.e., this is not just a matter
of science-envy by philosophers (or the even
more rare phenomenon of philosophy-envy
by scientists).
event, such as the details of the operating
room and the condition of the patient. A
scientifically-minded investigator may then
proceed to look for corroborating details
supporting the subject’s version of the story:
Was he really able to hear what the doctors
where saying? Did he actually, somehow, ob-
serve specific events that occurred in the
room? A scientist would then propose possi-
ble alternative explanations for the facts so
gathered (e.g., that the experience was
caused by a side effect of the anesthetics used
in preparation for the operation).
This
modus operandi
is typical of science
in general, not just when applied to claims
of the paranormal. The idea is that one
works within certain assumptions, e.g., that
there is no conscious attempt to deceive
the investigator, just as in the case of nor-
mal scientific research, where fraud is a
hypothesis of last resort. The investigator
then focuses on the details of the alleged
experience, attempting to see if they do or
do not correlate with the available evi-
dence, essentially playing the role of an
investigative detective—an analogy often
brought up to explain the nature of every-
day scientific research (what Kuhn aptly
called “normal” or “puzzle solving” sci-
ence).
A philosopher would approach the same
problem differently. In particular, she
would focus on the broad picture, on the
validity of background assumptions, and
on the internal coherence of the claims
under investigation. For example, she may
question what it means to “see” one’s body
from outside. To the best of our knowl-
edge, seeing is something we do with a
complex bodily apparatus that includes
not just eyes but a brain connected to them
and capable of interpreting light signals.
But if one is disembodied, how would “vi-
sion” work? Moreover, subjects who claim
to have undergone out-of-body experi-
ences usually talk as if their vision were of
the same kind as ordinary vision, i.e., with
a limited horizon. But if vision were some-
how possible outside of the constraints im-
posed by biological structures, why would
people not be able see at 360°? These sorts
of questions would complement and, per-
SCI-PHI AND THE FIGHT AGAINST
PSEUDOSCIENCE
There are many published examples of in-
teraction between science, particularly biology,
and philosophy when it comes to squarely sci-
entific questions: niche-construction theory
(Okasha 2005), the role of evo-devo within the
Modern Synthesis (Love 2003), the various
conceptions of biological species (Pigliucci
2003), the existence of laws in ecology (Mikkel-
son 2003), and the concept of fitness (Ariew
and Lewontin 2004), to mention just a few of
those that have been vigorously debated in re-
cent years. In what follows, I will briefly explore
the potential for fruitful interactions between
science and philosophy when it comes to form-
ing a joint defense against the assault from
pseudoscientific quarters. I will provide two ex-
amples, one illustrating how the methods of
science and philosophical inquiry can be com-
plementary in debunking pseudoscientific
claims, and the other of how philosophy can
play a decisive role in court rulings concerned
with the teaching of science in public schools.
As an example of sci-phi debunking pseudo-
science, consider the oft-made claim that peo-
ple have “out-of-body” experiences, when, un-
der certain conditions (for example, during
a surgical operation), a subject recalls having
found himself somehow outside of his own
body, observing the scene from a different
point of view, and even recalling some of the
things that were said or done despite the fact
that he was under sedation at the time (see
Novella 2002 and 2003). Now the classical,
scientific approach to analyzing this sort of
claim may begin, for instance, by analyzing
the physical circumstances of the alleged
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