The Computer Virus -- From There to Here, Hacking and IT E-Book Dump Release
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the M-commerce site using encryption
and certificates, and it is probable that
people will expect the repository
provider to verify the trustworthiness of
the M-commerce site on their behalf, by
checking the validity of certificates,
before releasing personal data. Fledgling
examples of this kind of online service
are only now arising — such as
Microsoft Passport — and they are cer-
tain to play an increasingly important
role in M-commerce.
highly valuable back-end systems. This,
coupled with the fact that handsets are
more easily lost or stolen than PCs
makes it doubly important that the
handset does not become the weak link
in the PKI. Ideally the handset should
verify the identity of the user using a bio-
metric measure, such as a fingerprint
scan, although this may be some years
away. In the interim, passwords and PIN
numbers must be used but are never
transmitted across the network in a PKI
based system. Handsets, by their very
nature, have the potential to transform
to the Personal Trusted Devices of the
future.
While M-commerce presents many
challenges to those implementing
security, none are insurmountable. Co-
operation among certification authori-
ties, mobile operators, systems
integrators and device manufacturers is
needed to ensure that mobile security is
implemented properly, and that different
implementations will be able interact.
Uniform standards need to be estab-
lished and adhered to. Governments
and regulators must create legislation,
guidelines and practices that allow
M-commerce to flourish.
Security can unlock the potential of
M-commerce and M-business. It is an
enabling rather than restrictive force that
builds trusted relationships between
businesses, their partners and consumers
on the move.
The future
While the role of the handset in a PKI
may be limited to transferring short
requests, these requests will unlock
The Computer Virus — From
There to Here.
Elk Cloner
, which was reported in 1981.
The first IBM-PC virus appeared in
1986. This was the
Brain
virus, a boot sec-
tor virus that remained resident. In 1987,
Brain
was followed by
Alameda (Yale),
Cascade, Jerusalem, Lehigh,
and
Miami
(South African Friday the 13th)
. These
viruses expanded the target executables to
include COM and EXE files and
Cascade
was encrypted to deter disassembly and
detection. Variable encryption appeared
in 1989 with the
1260
virus. Stealth
viruses, which employ various techniques
to avoid detection, also first appeared in
1989, such as
Zero Bug, Dark Avenger and
Frodo
(4096 or 4K). In 1990, self-modify-
ing viruses, such as
Whale
were intro-
duced. The year 1991 brought the
GP1
virus, which is ‘network-sensitive’ and
attempts to steal Novell NetWare pass-
words.
While some of the most commonly
detected viruses vary according to conti-
nent,
Stoned, Brain, Cascade
and members
of the
Jerusalem
family, have spread wide-
ly and continue to appear. In fact, a disk
scanning ‘fest’ in any large organization
could still encounter at least one of these.
This implies, according to Lawrence E.
Bassham & W. Timothy Polk, that highly
survivable viruses tend to be benign, repli-
cate many times before activation, or are
somewhat innovative — utilizing some
technique never used before in a virus.
An Historical Perspective.
Berni Dwan
I was sitting at my desk in the Computer Centre of University College, Dublin,
checking my E-mail. Suddenly, from the corner of my right eye, I detected an arm
swooping down towards my keyboard, like an axe about to fell a tree. This was an
arm with a mission. It removed my hand, which was just about to press ‘receive’ on
an interesting looking E-mail involving a Christmas tree greeting. Of course, my bet-
ter-informed colleague knew that this was the
Christma Exec
virus, and that I would
not be doing myself, or anyone else, any favours by accepting and executing it. It was
December 1987, and my very first introduction to the computer virus. My love affair
with the subject has continued over the past thirteen years (although I do not claim
to have a copy of The Little Black Book of Computer Viruses sitting on my book-
shelf!), and like myself, the computer virus has evolved into a more complex and
sophisticated entity.
The
Christma Exec
program spread to
thousands of VM/CMS installations
connected to EARN, BITNET and
IBM’s internal VNET, and would only
spread if a recipient received and (albeit
unintentionally) executed it. More strictly
a worm than a virus,
Christma Exec
was a
prophetic precursor to
Melissa
and
VBS/LoveLetter
, utilizing the increased use
of networks and desktop connectivity to
the Internet, and sending a copy of itself
to all of the users’ listed correspondents.
While probably the first newsworthy
virus, it was by no means the first, and
knowledge of the computer virus phe-
nomenon had already been in existence
for several years.
The term ‘computer virus’ was formally
defined by Fred Cohen in 1983, while he
performed academic experiments on a
Digital Equipment Corporation VAX sys-
tem. The first computer viruses were
developed in the early 1980s, the first
found in the wild was the Apple II virus,
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Vagaries of location aside, the virus pay-
load also comes in different sizes. David
Chess likens it to natural phenomena,
“Small earth tremors are much more
common than large earthquakes. Slight
rises in the level of a river are much more
common than floods.” So, accepting the
fact that small things happen often and
big things happen rarely, our manage-
ment of the smaller events is consequent-
ly better than our management of the
catastrophes, which, by their very nature
and sometimes their unpredictability, are
probably impossible to fully prepare for
anyway. But accepting the infrequent
occurrence of the great unknown, and
with the knowledge that the probability
of large computer virus incidents
increases annually, there are less and less
excuses to be caught totally unawares.
Unlike the victims of the 1988 Internet
Worm, which only God could have fore-
seen, we are now in a much better posi-
tion to postulate, prophesy and prepare.
Requiring no human intervention, the
Internet Worm’s automatic spread was
facilitated by some Unix bugs and fea-
tures that simply allowed it to hop from
machine to machine, replicating and
executing in what seemed an unstop-
pable demonic cycle. This is the type of
automatic spread that can also be
enabled by mobile code. There are
enough analysts and anti-virus resources
out there to keep us aware of the threats
and to advice us on practising 'safe com-
puting'. There are enough uploads,
downloads, updates, patches, free semi-
nars, bulletins, news alerts, 'in the wild'
and hoax lists to give even the most
lethargic of us some level of protection.
If we can understand the changing
technology we can understand and
appreciate the emerging threats, and be
aware of the products that are attempt-
ing to circumvent them. Imbedded
macros in Microsoft Word and Excel
documents (although the first macro
virus, WM/Concept.A has being doing
the rounds since 1995), mobile code in
the form of Java, ActiveX and Visual
Basic Script, and Trojan worms (with
their many zipped and packed permuta-
tions) are the obvious threats that spring
to mind. We should see new threats with
every new development. Unlike the
1988 Internet Worm victims, we do
have a chance to develop methods that
can handle the majority of pandemic
virus outbreaks, even if only to a modest
extent. There is also a bigger and more
established network of anti-virus experts
than there was in 1988. Despite the
march of time, it is still hard to believe
that the main success of
Melissa
was that
it needed human intervention to propa-
gate and spread. Just as if the clock had
been turned back to December 1987,
there were still far too many unquestion-
ing recipients of suspect E-mail. A
simple user awareness campaign could
have gone such a long way towards
minimizing
Melissa.
Bearing this in mind, David Chess
poses some appropriate questions, “How
will the continued growth of the Internet
change the pattern of virus spread and
similar threats. Is our current paradigm of
virus containment sufficient for the
future?” In 199,7 Chess foresaw integrat-
ed mail systems and mobile code having
an impact on virus spread. There is no
denying that this in fact has been the case,
and while ease of use and functionality is
paramount for the average Internet user,
the technology used to achieve this is
facilitating the active spread of network-
aware viruses. “We need to be prepared
for a world in which this sort of attack is
common, by employing security systems
that can deal with them routinely and
automatically, reducing them to the level
of ‘little tremors', so that we can free up
our experts to deal with whatever ‘Big
Quakes’ are coming down the wire
behind them.”
How does this practically manifest
itself? Well, in 1997, Chess was talking
about real-time detection and removal,
including analysis and interim action
before the forwarding of data, and this
has come to pass. A new development
was reported by Robert Lemos on
September 29th in
ZDNet
news whereby
Symantec Corp. have developed a tech-
nology to stop viruses that use scripting
— to infect, manipulate and destroy
programs and data on computers — by
blocking the use of certain commands
commonly used by malicious code. This
is a case of fighting the virus writers with
their own tools, since scripting languages
are also used by them to create viruses
and Trojan Horses that run on a variety
of platforms. Lemos quotes one consul-
tant who sees a weakness in the
Symantec defence, observing that each
scripting language (e.g. JavaScript, Perl)
will need unique software. When you
compare the number of scripting lan-
guages with the number of computer
viruses, this argument dies a swift death.
As Lemos points out, “keeping up with
the changes in scripting services could be
far easier than keeping track of the more
than 50 000 virus variants in the wild
today.”
There is no doubting that the
Melissa
virus, while causing untold grief across
the world, was also a valuable wake-up
call, in that while updating their anti-
virus software against
Melissa
, users auto-
matically protected themselves from a
host of other viruses that had not hit yet,
some of which were actually more malev-
olent than
Melissa
. This was highlighted
with the case of the
Chernobyl
strain
CIH
,
which hit at least 540 000 computers in
South Korea and Turkey in April 1999,
with a payload of reformatting hard dri-
ves and in some instances, zapping a key
chip on the computer motherboard.
Discovered in May 1998 and believed to
have originated in Taiwan, it is aimed at
Windows 95/98 platforms. The more
widespread variant strikes every 26th
April, the anniversary of the Chernobyl
nuclear disaster, a lesser strain striking on
the 26th of every month while a third
strikes on 26th June. It would be true to
say that
CIH
wreaked a certain amount of
havoc in both South Korea and Turkey,
but interestingly, nowhere else. The
Korean Supreme Court had to delay some
rulings because evidence saved on com-
puters was lost. The article speculates why
CIH
hit South Korea and Turkey in par-
ticular. One theory is that the virus piggy-
backed on pirated software which is quite
common in Asia. Another theory suggests
that unlike the US, Asia was largely unaf-
fected by the
Melissa
virus, thus they did
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not benefit from the
Melissa
victims wake
up call.
Melissa
and
VBS/LoveLetter
apart, the
virus hall of fame had many infamous
members throughout the 1990’s, each
responding or adapting in its own way to
the changes in computing environments,
machine types and operating systems.
Michelangelo
got the award for hype and
hysteria in 1992. Discovered in New
Zealand in 1991, an infected system
would have parts of its hard disk overwrit-
ten with random data if booted on the 6th
of March of any year. With such a poten-
tially damaging payload, the
Michelangelo
virus caught the attention of the media in
the run up to 6th March 1992.
Disastrous predictions of doomsday
proportions were being flouted on televi-
sion and print media. When the fateful
day dawned, there were no horsemen to be
seen riding across the sky. All was quiet on
the north, south, east and western front.
White, Kephart and Chess even say that it
was difficult to find a verified incidence of
destruction of data anywhere.
But is this because the build up was mere
hype, or because the people caught up in
the hype ensured that they had the appro-
priate anti-virus software in place before
the trigger date, and/or many IT managers
prevented the trigger date appearing on
their PCs? Like
Melissa
eight years later, it
provided the, by now passé, wakeup call to
the computer world.
Along with the hype, we also have the
hoaxes, and they have indeed become an
intrinsic part of the virus world. The hoax
payload is wasting peoples’ time and using
up precious bandwidth.
Hoaxes depend upon ignorance and
innocence, as well as peoples’ enthusiasm
for being good citizens and colleagues, by
passing on the dire warnings to as many
people as they can. Their misplaced good
deeds are merely playing into the hands of
those strange beings who instigate the
hoaxes.
HoaxKill (www.hoaxkill.com) currently
cites seven hoaxes on its active list and
eight on its rare list. Some of these have
been around for such a long time (
It Takes
Guts to Say 'Jesus'
and
Penpal Greetings
) that
it is hard to believe that there is anyone left
in the universe that can be fooled by them.
www.macafee.com have fifty nine hoaxes
listed on their site. It gets better with
Vmyths.com (www.vmyths.com), who
have one hundred and eight virus hoaxes
listed.
Sarah Gordon, in her paper
Hoaxes and
Hypes
, likens the prevalence of the com-
puter hoax to peoples' continued belief in
corn circles, even though in 1991, two
hoaxers admitted to creating them over a
fifteen year period.
She also cites the hoax carried out in
Australia in 1988 by Jose Luis Alvarez,
who claimed to be a channel for the spirit
Carlos. Again, when a Sixty Minutes pro-
gramme proved the feat to be a hoax,
Gordon points out that prior to this, the
Australian media had made no serious
efforts to check the accuracy of the story,
even though there were some glaring
inconsistencies.
To this day, people still believe in corn
circles and Carlos. In fact, the next time
you receive a virus hoax warning from a
friend or colleague, you might include in
your response your fears concerning the
spread of corn circles, and await their
reply! Among her reasons cited for buying
into computer virus or other hoaxes are:
trust in authority, excitement, lack of
appropriate scientific skepticism, sense of
importance or belonging, and finally, fur-
thering our own goals and self interests.
There are two important terms used in
‘virus speak’ and they need to be under-
stood, especially if we are to put the fig-
ures and statistics pertaining to computer
may first be shocked at the figure, and
secondly, we may ask ourselves, how
come my computer is not infected every
other day if there is that amount of mali-
cious code working its way around cyber-
space?
The terms I refer to are, 'In the Wild'
and 'Zoo', and you will perhaps be less
familiar with the second.
The phrase, 'In the Wild', was first
coined by David Chess in 1990/91 to
describe real-world virus incidents or
those which pose an active threat to a real
world PC.
'Zoo' viruses, while obviously existing,
are not an active threat. When consider-
ing the effectiveness of anti-virus soft-
ware, it is important to be aware of the
meaning of these terms, because it is the
product's ability to counteract the real
world threat that you are interested in.
If we did not have a de facto standard
like 'In the Wild', simply comparing
products by detection rates would be
meaningless. As perhaps the product with
the higher detection rate might include
many 'Zoo' viruses, which are not a threat
to us, and the product with the lower
detection rate might include most of the
'In the Wild' viruses that we should be
concerned about.
According to Sarah Gordon, the
WildList
represents the most organized
effort to catalogue those viruses which are
spreading, although it may not contain all
'In the Wild' viruses, and should more
appropriately considered as a subset of the
'In the Wild' viruses, albeit, a core set that
every anti-virus product must be able to
detect.
In 2001 the computer virus will be
twenty years old. We are now concerned
with stealth, polymorphic and armoured
viruses.
Dr. Fred Cohen's definitive definition
of the computer virus, “Any software
which can modify other programs to
include a (possibly evolved) version of
itself,” still stands, but the complexity
which has ensued as a result of the con-
stant battle of wits between the virus writ-
ers and the anti-virus software developers
may require an updated definition.
“the next time you receive
a virus hoax warning from
a friend or colleague, you
might include in your
response your fears
concerning the spread of
corn circles, and await
their reply!”
viruses into a realistic perspective. If a
newspaper article tells us that there are
50 000 computer viruses in existence, we
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Medium and low risk viruses simply
replicate or deliver an innocuous payload.
High risk viruses, those that corrupt,
delete, reformat, crash or flood come in
several guises.
The three broad categories, system
(boot record), file and multi-partite infec-
tors still remain, but they increasingly uti-
lize the stealth and polymorphic
approaches, rendering them far more dif-
ficult to trap and kill.
So, how has the stealth and polymor-
phic medley made life more difficult for
the anti-virus software industry?
Polymorphic viruses have been crafted to
vary themselves when infecting new disks
or machines. One of their tricks is to
imbed a do-nothing instruction in their
own source code to prevent a virus scan-
ner from looking for strings of code which
match known viruses.
The more sophisticated polymorphic
viruses actually encrypt virus code with
randomly generated numbers, and
decrypt the virus each time it is executed.
This negates the traditional signature
matching approach of anti-virus software
and requires specially constructed search
engines, which can identify encryption
schemes. Programs known as mutation
engines allow almost any virus to be made
into a polymorphic virus, the
MtE
muta-
tion engine being the best known.
Stealth, on the other hand, is a technique
employed by viruses to conceal themselves,
rather than a virus type itself. Often, these
programs monitor disk accesses, and if a
request is made to read the boot record, the
virus redirects the disk read to the original
boot record, stored by the virus, negating
any attempts to spot an altered boot
record. The anti-virus workaround here is
that most of these viruses can be spotted by
checking to see if there are any of these ille-
gal ‘hooks’ into the interrupt used for disk
access.
With the discovery of the first Palm OS
virus this September, one can see the
amphitheatre widening.
The battle of wits continues. Simple
replicating viruses were caught by signa-
ture matching. Encrypted viruses that hid
the fixed signature were caught by virus
scanners searching for tell tale sequences
of bytes that identified a specific decryp-
tion routine.
In the case of that formidable adver-
sary, the polymorphic virus, the
response of the anti-virus writers was to
develop generic decryption techniques
that would trick it into decrypting and
revealing itself.
But it is the virus authors who lead the
way, as the anti-virus industry treads the
Ferris wheel of reacting to their malicious
code. They will continue to challenge the
anti-virus industry, although the industry
is looking forward itself, and is getting
better at predicting new threats.
Carey Nachenberg predicts several even
more complex permutations of the poly-
morphic virus. This is a constant chal-
lenge for the anti-virus industry, but
surely they have more technical resources
and man power than the virus writers?
It is also the case of many against a few,
but hopefully this will always be enough
to keep the birth rate of viruses down and
the death rate up, thus avoiding too
many future epidemics.
Notes
[1]
hreat Assessment of Malicious Code
and Human Threats
, National
Institute of Standards and
Technology Computer Security
Division, 1994
[2] Only spread on 5.25 diskettes.
Introduction of 3.5 diskettes in the
late 1980’s saw its demise.
[3] Improved technology helped to
eliminate this, its conduit being
boot diskettes, which were increas-
ingly replaced by hard disks from
the mid 1980’s.
[4]
Threat Assessment of Malicious Code
and Human Threats
, National
Institute of Standards and
Technology Computer Security
Division, 1994
[5]
The Future of Viruses on the Internet
— originally presented at the
Virus
Bulletin International Conference
,
San Francisco, October, 1997
[6]
The Future of Viruses on the Internet
– originally presented at the
Virus
Bulletin International Conference
,
San Francisco, October, 1997
[7] Dan Schrader, Trend Micro Inc.
[8] Robert Lemos,
ZDNet News
, April
28, 1999
[9] Steve R White, Jeffrey O Kephart,
David M Chess.
Computer Viruses:
A Global Perspective
, 1995
[10] Sarah Gordon,
Hoaxes and Hypes
,
1997
[11] Sarah Gordon,
What is Wild?
IBM
TJ Watson Research Centre
[12] Sarah Gordon,
What is Wild?
IBM
TJ Watson Research Centre
[13] These attach themselves to the sys-
tem files stored on a disk. Any for-
matted disk can be infected.
Examples include Stealth viruses,
Stoned and AntiCMOS
[14] Attach themselves to COM or EXE
files. When infected files run, the
virus code executes first and infects
other executables or makes itself
resident before continuing with
the actual program. This class
includes the Hitchcock, Shake,
and Dark Avenger viruses.
[15] These infectors have been pro-
grammed to be able to infect both
files and boot records. Examples
include the BootEXE and EXEBug
viruses.
[16] Created by
Dark Avenger
[17] Mark Hazen,
Infection Detection,
Virus-Proofing Your LAN
, Office of
Information and Instruction tech-
nology, 1995.
[18] PalmOS/Phage.963
[19]
Understanding and Monitoring
Polymorphic Viruses
, Carey
Nachenberg, Symantec Enterprise
Papers, Volume XXX
[20]
Understanding and Monitoring
Polymorphic Viruses
, Carey
Nachenberg, Symantec Enterprise
Papers, Volume XXX
[21] Explained in Steve R White,
Jeffrey O Kephart, David M
Chess.
Computer Viruses: A Global
Perspective
, 1995
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